to anukalpa. And as the three factors of the legion are one, so these three are also one.

Other correspondences, from different standpoints may be noted:—

A—sanukalpa—kāmanā—syām
U—vikalpa—ichchhā—bahu
M—anukalpa—kāṅkṣhā—āsma

or

kāmanā—kāṅkṣha
kāṅkṣha—ichchhā
ichchhā—kāmanā

Abandoning sanukalpa and vikalpa, the jīva becomes a yōgi and dwells constantly in anukalpa. The yōgi is he who ‘joins together all things into one,’ who knows that all experiences come to all. The mukta is he who is ‘delivered’ from the belief, the heresy, of the separateness of the Three. The brahmaṇa is he who knows Brahmaṇ.

The process of sanukalpa—vikalpa—anukalpa makes up vichāra, thought, thinking, mind—moving, mind—revolving. The power that decides, that brings out nishchayā,

1 ‘Living in the present,’ ‘presence of mind,’ ‘enough for the day is the evil thereof,’ ‘whatsoever thine hand findeth to do, do it with all thy might,’ ‘resourcefulness,’ ‘readiness for all happenings,’ ‘power of adjustment,’ ‘adaptability’—are the words which help to bring out the significance of the condition, from the empirical standpoint.

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certainty, ‘final choice,’ from amidst these processes, is buddhi, intelligence, intellect, or reason. Vichāra is the work or action of buddhi, (adhyavasāya or nishchayā being the fruit of that action). Sānchita, doubt, corresponds to Samsāra, the World-process, manyness, and to vikalpa or vacillation. Nishchayā, certainty, decision or determination, corresponds to Ātmā, the Self and the One, and to sanukalpa or resolve. Siddhānta or ‘established truth’ gathers and sums up both.

Vichāra, from another standpoint, subdivides into āsmṛti, viśmṛti and anuśmṛti, non-remembrance, forgetting, and expectation, respectively. Smṛti, recollection, is the significance or characterising essence of them all, that is to say, the nature of recollection defines the nature of the other mental processes.

The power or faculty of recollection is buddhi, for only the certain, the decided and determined, facts are remembered. That which has been ascertained in all ways, as ‘this is thus only’—the

1 Viśmṛti seems to be more like ‘erroneous recollection’ than mere negative ‘forgetting’ which would be only non-remembrance already separately mentioned. Also, from one standpoint, it would seem that smṛti, āsmṛti, and viśmṛti are the trinity of which the summation is anuśmṛti.
holding of such an ascertained fact in the mind through all time, with the belief that other than it is not possible—such is the form or nature of memory. That which is uncertain and unnecessary \(^1\) with respect to oneself, 'was it, is it, or could it be thus or not thus?'—such is the form of vismṛti, forgetting. The cause of vismṛti is bhrama, 'wandering,' inattention, delusion. The 'power' or faculty of vismṛti is therefore abuddhi, non-intelligence, the nature of which is uncertainty. Anusmṛti comes out, arises by, or by means of a combination of smṛti and vismṛti. That which occurred in the past has been forgotten; that which belongs to to-day, the present time, is being remembered; what has occurred and occurs in past and present time will also occur in the future;—this set of facts and beliefs, permeated with hope, is the form or nature of anusmṛti, 'after-memory,' expectation. The power or faculty of anusmṛti is suddhi, the good or discerning intellect. Vismṛti refers to past time, smṛti to present, and anusmṛti to future.

\(^1\) The word 'unnecessary' seems to have a retrospective significance here; it is only what is not felt to be necessary and does not arouse interest and so arrest attention which is not strongly and accurately impressed on the memory.

Methods of Conjunction of the Ultimates.

Other correspondences may be noted as follows—

A—Atmā—smṛti—pratyakṣa—saṅkalpa—

kaṇḍkṣā.

U—Samsāra—anuṣmṛti—mirñaya—anukalpa—

āstā.

M—Nirñeya—vismṛti—anumāna—vikalpa—

ichchā.

Vichāra, thinking, is the sattā, the being, of all three, and jñāna, cognition, knowledge, underlies and unifies them all.

Memory and expectation are, it is obvious, mutually dependent. Anusmṛti, (as association of ideas) expectation, even etymologically means 'that which follows memory,' smanama. Memory too, conversely, depends on expectation (through the desire for results in the future which stimulates and strengthens memory; which, indeed, justifies the existence of memory and makes it useful and therefore possible and necessary). Some other aspects of this side of consciousness may be noted. Smanama, recollection, refers to all-time (and belongs to the ideal). Dhāraṇā, holding, holding in consciousness, is in essence the same thing as smanama, (but belongs to the 'real').

\(^2\) As with 'wish' and, 'desire,' so with 'memory' and 'recollection' or 'remembrance,' the meaning seems to have changed in the course of the development of the words from the roots. The root of
They may be distinguished thus: Smaraṇa is the means; dhāraṇā is the accomplishment. Smaraṇa is the action; dhāraṇā is the result thereof. That which is seen or heard or cognised now (in this particular time), is always (in all-times)—such is the work of dhāraṇā. Because there is no real difference between now and then (both being aspects of the partless 'emptiness' called time) therefore all is everywhere and always.

'memory' and 'smṛti' is possibly the same, but smṛti now has more the significance of recollection or act of remembrance from time to time, while dhṛti implies persistency, or tenacity of holding in consciousness, the power of memory, or retentiveness. So 'desire' is now used with an implication of greater permanence and depth than 'wish,' and therefore is for practical purposes a better equivalent to ichchā than 'wish,' notwithstanding that the latter seems to be derived from the same root iṣṭa as ichchā. Another fact worth noting is that though some of the explanations given, in the text above, of kāmanā, seem to mark it as the more comprehensive wordl and the fitter to take the middle place in the triple sub-division of consciousness recognised in this work, yet as a fact ichchā is given this place between jñāna and kriyā throughout the remaining sections of the book. Other allied meanings of dhṛti are endurance, patience, self-possession, non-self-forgetfulness, etc.

Thus there is no real difference between dhṛti and smṛti, memory and recollection. Smaraṇa is a form of cognition; the safe 'placing' away of that which is obtained thereby is dhṛti.

The knowledge that is or lies between Ātma and Saṁśāra, that is to say, the knowledge of Saṁśāra from the point of view of Ātma and the knowledge of the Self from the point of view of the world—this is smṛti or smaraṇa. 'The world is'—this is the knowledge (of the world) by the Self. 'The Ātma is'—this is the knowledge of (the Self by) the world. The binding together of the two in the way or by the means of īś— is smṛti. The connectedness, the conjunctionness, the condition of their being merged together, is dhṛti. Thus it is said that the world is held within the Self, and the Self held within the world. That the world never exists apart from the Self, and the Self never apart from the world—this is the nature (and consequence) of dhṛti. The standing together, the conjunctural condition, of things which have one common being, which are not in reality separate, but appear as separate—this is memory. Its nature, its form, is that of the mutual dependence and implication of all things whatsoever; everything contains all things whatsoever. Even in separateness, the two, the
Self and the Not-Self, are connected as ‘other-and-other,’ ‘each-other,’ paraspara; this reference to ‘the other’ exists inviolably and necessarily in each. Therefore the combination of the two (or, rather, the holding of the whole Not-Self in the Self by the Self) is memory (i.e., is the fact or the principle which manifests in the consciousness of the individual jiva as memory).

Cognition, knowledge, is possible only by means of the senses, (that is to say, only when the Self has become identified with a limited organism), and only when two things (subject and object on the one hand, and the two factors of opposed pairs, dvandva, both factors falling under the term ‘object,’ on the other hand) come together.

The succession (of the moods, conscious states, psychoses) of the jiva is endless time. It is also the significance and constitution of memory, which too has therefore an endless stretch and extension. This endlessness, pseudo-infinity, is observable everywhere in the world, in time, in action, speech, knowledge, etc. Each moment of time and each item of the others is connected with an endless series of other similar moments and items. We may notice memory within memory, and memory within that again, and so on, ad infinitum. We remember that we remembered; we hold that we held (such and such a view). We learn from the Vedas that there are sruti-srṣṭi and manasa-srṣṭi, ‘worlds of memory’ and ‘worlds of mind or thought (or thought-forms). Mandasa-vichara, ‘mental-travel,’ thinking, thought, is the thread of and through ‘forgetfulness, memory, and expectation,’ corresponding respectively to vikalpa, saṅkalpa, and anukalpa, doubt, resolve, and alternative resource.

We may consider a few illustrations: In the logion, Aham-bahu-syām, ‘I—many—may-become,’ the I is the Atmā, and the many is the Samsāra. The many in the I is memory. The I is mere oneness, and the memory of the many is necessary to it because of its relativity to the many. Without the memory of the many, the expression, ‘may I become,’ were impossible.
That such memory is existent everywhere (as sub-consciousness) appears from the fact that this logion is embodied and illustrated in the life, for instance, of the vegetable kingdom also; the one plant becomes the many seeds.

Memory embodies all procession, all progress and evolution. Taking shape as an ideal to strive after, working in the way of the constant contemplation of the lives of the Great Ones, it leads on the small to become like the great. Indeed, memory may be said to be identical with the whole of the World-process itself, being immanent in the conjunction of Self and Not-Self, Ātman and Samsāra, Aham and Bahu.

We may distinguish between jñāna and smarāṇa or cognition and memory by saying that the second stage or condition or transformation of cognition is memory; jñāna precedes, smarāṇa succeeds. Jñāna belongs to all time, is beginningless and endless, in as much as it belongs to the present which includes past and future; while memory belongs to the successive, to succession, to the beginnings and endings in time. Jñāna as a whole belongs to all-time, i.e., to time as a whole; but its parts equally necessarily belong to the parts and successions of time. These parts of jñāna or knowledge are named smṛti, recollection.1

Because memory is inseparably connected with time in its parts, i.e., with beginnings and endings, therefore are there breaks of memory from birth

1 The preceding remarks about the distinctions between smṛti and dhṛti, etc., may have appeared obscure. Their meaning will become plain as soon as the significance of the Logion I.—not-I.—Not, is realised. And when the nature of memory is understood in the light of this Logion, then the theoretical difficulties which now perplex psycho-physicists and those engaged in psychological research as to how to explain sub- or supra- or subliminal or supraliminal consciousness and as to whether individuals are in touch with cosmic consciousness or not, etc., will vanish. See The Science of Peace, pp. 287-288.
to birth ordinarily. The exceptions that occur from time to time, the cases of yogīs, the cases of dīvya-dṛśti, 'divine sight' or clairvoyance, of tri-kāla-jñāntā, 'knowledge of the three times, past, present, and future,' mean that what to the ordinary person would be a series of distinct periods, separate parts of time, and of memories, has become reduced into one time, one present, and one pratyakṣa, direct and immediate cognition or intuition, to the seer. Ordinarily the 'present' signifies the time extending from the beginning to the finishing of some one act, one condition, one life-time; hence memory commonly ranges within one life-time only. Such succession, beginning and ending in time, past, present and future, is the only way, the sine qua non, of manifestation, of existence and non-existence. Apart from it there is neither 'is,' nor 'is not,' nor 'not is.' As said before smidtī refers to the present, vimaṇṭi to the past and anusmṛti to the future.

Each one of this triplet of past, present and future is repeated endlessly within each of the others. Such pseudo-infinity is observable everywhere in the World-process, as noted before. We have succession within succession, time within time, form within form, work within work, alphabet within alphabet, name within name, universe within universe, all within all, and Brahman within Brahman.

But while this pseudo-infinity of details within details corresponds to the infinity of the Universal Consciousness, each individual consciousness deals with and comprehends only a limited portion of the details. Hence we have the fact that what is called the omniscience of Brahmā and other high Gods signifies only that their 'memories' co-extend with vast but always limited cycles and circles of time and space and motion.

Memory is the basis of all reasoning, inference, argument, anumāna and nirṇaya, induction and deduction. Pratyakṣa, direct cognition, is also used and summed up within it. The more comprehensive the memory, the stronger and more decided the other intellectual processes. Every jīva is potentially omniscient.

But we cannot say that because the jīva possesses omniscience potentially therefore it

1 The difference between jīva and jīva is due to the difference in the order of the events, or experiences. If this order or succession, a mere emptiness, is abolished, only the collective total of experiences remains and 'all' jīvas merge into One, and worlds go into pralaya. Thus we see that the mere order of the contents of memory is the foundation of separate individuality and is at every moment of our existence that which distinguishes us from one another. (Yoga-Sūtra, IV. 14 and The Science of Peace, p. 319).
possesses distinct memory through and of all time actually, for the word ‘all’ is, strictly, transcendental. Ordinarily, it means the whole of some one series only, for it is not independent of succession. Hence, memory, forgetting and expectation, appear even in those that are called omniscient. Omniscience, we see then, is also relative and comparative, and means, successively, with reference to the stages of the evolutionary growth of jīvas, ‘full knowledge of the contents of a yuga, a māhā-yuga, a kālpa, a māhā-kālpa, a māna vāntara, a māhā-māna vāntara, etc’. Hence yōgīs too cannot be said to possess full comprehension of the complete details of the transcendental ‘all’, but only of the relative or comparative ‘all’ included in some one principal cycle.¹

¹ Speaking of yōgīs and brāhmaṇas, etc., as the holders of such knowledge, the author branches off here into a ‘metaphysical’ interpretation of the Veda-text which is regarded as the foundation of the caste-system of India. The interpretation may be gathered here in a footnote because of its interest, and as a specimen of the thought of the author. ‘The brāhmaṇa was its mouth’—the mouth of Brāhman means jñāna, knowledge; from and by knowledge only the brāhmaṇa was born, lives and shall live, always. ‘The rājanyā was made the arms’—the rājanyā or kṣaṭṭriya is he who is steadfast in the practice of rājayoga, the royal

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This āntārya, ‘relativity,’ ‘similarity in diversity,’ extends everywhere. Like other greatness and smallness, great knowledge and or highest form of yōga; bāhu, (which is commonly explained as the arm, in accordance with current Samskṛt grammar) is Samsāra, the World-process; he is the maker of Samsāra by means of the resolve ‘May I become bāhu or many’. By the use of the word bāhu, (transformed by some rule of archaic Samskṛt grammar into bāhu) it is meant that all the world has separately the right to jñāna, knowledge. ‘The vaishya came from the knee’—jāna (ordinarily meaning the knee but probably connected in archaic Samskṛt with jñā, to know, in some way) means the extent of memory; ‘jāna is used for smana’. Vaishya signifies the bringing of the senses into vāsha or control. ‘The śuddra was born from the feet’—pāda, foot, refers to service. The realisation of all beings as the Self and consequent service of all—such is the characteristic of the śuddra. All these refer to the knowledge of Brāhman. Such is the author’s metaphysical reduction of the four castes into different stages in the growth of the same jīva, showing its gradual growth in Brāhman-realisation, the stages being named by the names of the castes, but in an order the inverse of that currently given to them, the śuddra standing for the stage of highest self-sacrifice and therefore the most practical realisation of the Self.

¹ The modern Samskṛt equivalent is sāpekṣhya.