small knowledge are also always comparative only. Strictly, the whole of knowledge, the whole of Samsāra, exists within each thousand-thousandth of each atom. The uṣṭhāraṇa, ‘up-taking,’ ‘recovery’ of any particular item out of this potential all-knowledge is memory.

In one sense memory may be said to be a form of a-bhāva or non-being, because it has no immediate outwardly existing object; but it is not pure non-being, it is a latent condition or mode of jñāna and has always a beginning and an end as only things existent have. And beginning and end are always relative to and inseparably connected with each other; what has a beginning has an end, and vice versa; so too, what is beginningless is endless, and vice versa.

It is true that there is a current belief that a-bhāva, non-being, had no beginning but has an end. But on scrutiny, it appears that being and non-being are called ‘endless’ only with respect to one aspect of each, that ‘being’ underlies both being and non-being, that that sāttā, ‘being,’ in both is one and the same, and that only that

\[\text{Taken together with the important distinction pointed above between the transcendental all and the comparative all, this sentence seems to throw much light on the significance and value of processes of meditation, the steadying of the chitta-atom and so enabling it to reflect the all instead of a few (Yoga-sātra, I. 32, III. 33, 54, etc.)}\]

which is can become is not. A-bhāva, non-being, implies that nothing, i.e., nothing as itself a fact, is. Negation, indeed, is the Shakti, the Energy, of Brahma. Thus, strictly, both being and nothing are beginningless and endless, and they are immanent in each other.

(The meaning of the above may perhaps be made more clear and concrete in this fashion. A-bhāva, non-being, pure and simple, if it has no beginning has no end either. What has an end is the a-bhāva, the non-existence, of some particular thing. This tree, this house, this town, was not, and now is. But as soon as we speak of some one particular thing as being non-existent at any particular time, we necessarily postulate the possible existence of that thing in a preceding time. The thing is first present in our consciousness, and we notice its non-existence in any particular space and time in the second moment. The negation of a thing assumes significance, acquires meaning, after and not before the affirmation, even though as a mere possibility, of that thing. Undefined negation, if beginningless, is also endless. Defined negation, negation defined, demarcated, specialised, by and of any thing, the non-existence of some one particular thing, is neither beginningless nor endless. It had a beginning, for our consciousness—and the specialisation or definition has no significance at all apart from ‘our consciousness’—
the moment after the special thing came into our consciousness; it began when, after having postulated the thing of which it is predicated in one moment, in the next moment we noticed its non-existence. Thus then, there is an indefensible relativity and connexion between 'being' and 'non-being' or 'nothing', and between 'existence' and 'non-existence'. When we say that non-being is beginningless we mean that no being or nothing ever was, or, in other words, that 'all' was not; and if this is true then it is also true that no being or nothing ever will be, or, in other words, that 'all' will never be. But if we say 'non-existence,' i.e., the non-existence of this particular thing, has an end, then it is also true that the non-existence of this particular thing had a beginning also. This is so true indeed, that we have the fact embodied in such proverbs as that 'there is nothing new under the sun,' but that there are only repetitions and recurrences. And this is not surprising, for, by metaphysic, fact and consciousness mean the same thing.1)

So the arising and disappearing of memory are also mutually related by means of the

1The above discussion has a special bearing on the practical question whether mokṣa or mukti or nirvāṇa, once attained, lasts ever and ever, i.e., for the rest of all time, or not. The current view, as held by all the 'believing' schools of Indian

common element of cognition, even as being and nothing are mutually immanent in the philosophy to-day, is that bandha, bondage, or avidyā, nescience, has no beginning but has an end; and that, conversely, mukti, liberation, has a beginning but has no end. Loss of the true metaphysic, confusion as to the real nature of liberation and the wish to avoid the troubles of return from freedom into bondage—these are the parents of this current and illogical view which really does not carry conviction even to the professors of it. To the metaphysic expounded in this work it is clear and unobjectionable and indeed perfectly satisfactory that the freedom which has a beginning should have and has an end again in bondage also, while the freedom that has no end has no beginning either. See the last section of the work for unmistakable statements on this point.

Note:—Psychological observations occur all over the work naturally in view of the fact that the triplet of cognition, desire and action is almost the foundation of its system, its importance therein being second only to that of the ultimate triplet of Self, Not-Self and Negation which is the deepest and most essential ground-work. Yet the bulk of the psychology of the work, in the modern sense of the term, may be said to be gathered in this section. Nowhere else in the course of the work is there such a connected discussion of psychological topics except
all inclusive Brahma, best named by the all comprehending AUM, the contents of which in two other places towards the close of the third section where the emotions and again the nature of manas and buddhi, etc., are discussed. It has been already remarked in a previous foot-note that different races and sub-races perceive different aspects of the same facts; and this is very noticeable in the sub-topics treated here. The sub-topics that are familiar in modern western works of psychology are not to be readily found here in the identical form. The main topics, cognition, desire and action, are also somewhat different from the modern tripartite division of intellect, feeling and will; that the former is the really accurate and much the more valuable classification will be obvious to the reader who goes through the whole work. The syllabus printed in the article on Psychology in Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, may be also cited as showing the tendency of western psychologists to travel in the direction of the older classification. For a discussion of the subject the reader may be referred to The Science of the Emotions, 1903, The Science of Peace, 1904, and an article entitled “Pure Verbalism” published in Theosophical Review for April 1905. As to such sub-topics as sensation, perception, conception, attention, appreciation, selection, comparison, association of ideas, imagination, judgment, belief, constructiveness, instinct, impulse, ethics, aesthetics, etc., etc., to say nothing of the topics newly created by the development-

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are expounded in the Vedas with their Angas and Upangas.

of psycho-physics—these are not treated of in this work in their exact modern sense. The reason is, in the first place, of course, the fact that the work does not profess to be an exhaustive one on psychology, but only an outline of metaphysic, and in the second place, the difference of standpoint of the author. At the same time, it must be obvious to the careful student that the sources of all these sub-topics are touched upon in the book, and that if the successive classification and continuous sub-division by triplets were carried out to any length, all the shades and aspects or modes and ‘faculties’ of consciousness or mind that have been caught by modern psychology would find their due places in that scheme with much other valuable material besides. Facts and indications of psycho-physics will be found here also, later on, not in the way of inchoate and unconscious suggestions, but of statements of developed results of investigation as to the connexion of nerve-ganglia with mental processes, the localisation of functions, and the formation of living organisms by and out of atoms; only unfortunately the statements are far too few and therefore help but to tantalise. It is more than likely that the works on Yoga in that literature to which the Praya-vaeda belongs, would, if brought to light, be found to contain more information on this subject of psycho-physics.