CHAPTER XXII.
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS AS TO KRIYÀ.

The supreme importance of kriyà.—Philological considerations and illustrations.—Opposite doctrines; (a) all words are derivative and of gradual growth and evolution; (b) all are radical and fortuitous.—Reconciliation by difference of standpoint.—Triplets involved by kriyà.—Space-time-motion as objective conditions of it.—Definitions of space, of time, and of energy (in place of motion).—Their relations, as locus standi, one to another.—The subjective conditions of kriyà.—Karà or actor.—Kàryà, act or work.—Kàra or cause or instrumental cause, instrument.—Prayojana, ‘engaging’ motive.—Explanation of free-will or self-dependence.—Metaphysical considerations of the interdependence of all.—Correspondences.

The supreme importance of kriyà, work, action, is manifest from the fact that the whole of the World-process is one constant activity. Even the correct use of language is not possible without action (i.e., without the action of speaking, obviously; and also, without the employment of words denoting activity). It may be said that sense may be conveyed also by the exclusive use of subântas, nouns variously inflected with propositional terminations. But in reality such nouns always imply and depend upon tiângântas, verbs variously inflected.\(^1\) (For when it is said that subântas suffice by themselves to convey sense, what is really done is that krdântas, various participles (which, for purposes of case-endings behave exactly like the other subântas) are included amongst the subântas and regarded as one with them; and so only, i.e., by using krdântas with subântas, can any sense be intelligibly conveyed. And it is obvious that in reality krdântas are the same as tiângântas. In the (apparently verbless Samskrît) sentence, ‘This, here, by me done; not done by thee,’ composed of ‘nouns’ only.

\(^1\) All these considerations of grammar may at first sight perhaps appear inappropriate to the modern reader accustomed to meet with grammar and psychology in separate text-books only. But he should remember that the Praséva-Śastra purports to be an encyclopedia of the underlying principles of all the sciences, showing the interrelation between them; and further that thought and language are particularly interdependent at the present stage of evolution, sound and akàśa being earlier manifestations than the others. Not only in Samskrít, but even in other languages also, though perhaps to a lesser extent, philology throws light on psychology in a most valuable manner.
although the word 'done' appears to be a participial adjective to 'work,' yet in reality it amounts to the verb-expression, 'has been done.' If this same analysis is pursued further it will appear that even as कर्णपात्ता, participial adjectives, behaving as the nouns with which they are in apposition, have their manifest foundation in verb-roots, even so these nouns proper of to-day ultimately derive their origin in the past from roots denoting activity.

The व्युप्तापक्षा, 'derivation-doctrine,' in grammar is expressly this that all nouns are derived and evolved out of verbs, by the successive addition of various suffixes and prefixes, etc., to the latter. On the other side is the अव्युप्तापक्षा, 'non-derivation-doctrine.' This doctrine holds that all words, names, namings, are underrived, radical, fortuitous, arbitrary, like Brāhmaṇa itself; that they are independent of all considerations of time, space, and affinity with others; that they have no analysable characteristics, and are each and all pre-determined, like all the other items of all Becoming, all the World-process; that no real explanation of them is possible; and that each speaker uses them according as their meanings appear to him under the stress of his necessity so that the same word-sound means one thing in one

language and entirely another in another.

The reconciliation between these views is that in one sense all words are derivative; and in another, all radical. The words that express disruption of the unity of the I, refer to activity, and are all derived from verb-roots denoting action; this is the view from the standpoint of व्याज्ञ, the part, the particular, the individual. On the other hand, the words that are concerned with the universal unity of the I, they are non-derivative, radical; this is the standpoint of सार्विक, universal. And, finally, each and every word is both of these, in turn, from different standpoints; each is derivative and each radical. 1

1 This may perhaps be expressed in other words thus: We may be able to trace the existing words of any language further and further back to roots behind roots; but wherever we come to a stop, there, we must admit, at least for the time being and till we can burrow further, that the connexion between that last-found root and its meaning is fortuitous. Onomatopoeia will not help beyond certain limits. That the serpent moving through grass should make the sound 'sarp, sarp' or 'srip, srip' is itself fortuitous, accidental, arbitrary. We may develop our science of acoustics and of the physiology of the auditory apparatus, and, going a step further, understand how that particular shaking of grass appears as that particular sound to this
words refer to kriyā, and the radical are sanāṭanā, eternal.

The sāthāna, locus standi, of activity is desha, space. All action takes place in space and is impossible without it. The triplet here is desha-kāla-kriyā, space-time-motion. That wherein and whereby is possible the many-ness of the This, the opposition to the unity of the I—that is Space. In other words, it is the avasṭhā, the condition of the negation or identity between I and This. It is true that when avasṭhā is spoken of, there is already an implication of some kind of action (sāthā, to stand); yet the predominant reference is to the ‘standing,’ the continuance in one place of that action; and so avasṭhā comes invariably to imply space. The etymology runs thus: avaḥ is the Ātmā which ought to be carefully ‘guarded’ on all sides and is in turn the ‘protector’ of all; and that wherein it stands and manifests is sāthā. Thus the general condition of the possibility of the ‘standing’ of all particular conditions and states is Space. As the Brahma-Sūtra says: The state of opposition to the Unity of the Self is the many, nānā; and the opposition to the identification of the many is Space (i.e., the

1 In modern Sanskrit Grammar, avaḥ, as a prefix, means ‘on all sides, all round;’ and avaḥ, as a verb-root, means to protect.
necessary condition in which becomes possible that opposition; or that space is itself of the nature of opposition between the one and the many, which, by mutual abolition, make emptiness).

Again, the Brahma-Sūtra says: The succession in and of the many is time, Kāla.

Yet again: The necessity of the succession is Shakti, Ability, Might, Energy.

These three aphorisms define the essential nature of the triplet. The necessary ‘becoming,’ coming forth, manifesting (co-existently) of the many is dēsha, space. Whatever ‘becomes’ has phases or conditions; and we also want to enquire ‘where does it become, i.e., manifest’.

‘What happens; what or who causes it to, i.e., why does it, happen; how does it happen, by what process or method’—all these are allied considerations. The very etymology and definition of the word dēsha shows the real nature of the fact indicated, that wherein a thing is

1 Compare the Purāṇika legend that Kāla-Rudra, a form of Shiva, corresponding to desire, tāmas or ichchā and time, kāla, which also means ‘black’) was born from Brahmanda (corresponding to kriya) and that Brahma was born from Viśnu (corresponding to jñāna and Self.) Also the Purāṇa verse विष्णुप्राणपति भर्गो

2 It is not easy to fix the correspondence exactly
These four correspond, as usual, to A, U, M and the total, or cognition, desire, action and the summation. Indeed the totality of these four is kriyā. The definition or description of kriyā is possible only by means of these four. The etymology of kriyā is manifold; so also is its significance.¹ (i) karaṇam, doing, acting, is kriyā, the act or action itself. Or (ii) kriyate anena or anayā, that by or by means of which (a thing or act) is done, acted, made, is kriyā. This construction is connected with the idea of causal effort. Again (iii) karoti iti kriyā, ‘does,’ ‘acts’—this itself is kriyā. Here the reference is to the actor, the doer, the maker, karta. The manifestation of the kriyā (self-assertion or self-realisation by external expression), the final purpose of the other three, is the motive, prayojana.

Karum yogyam, that which is fit, between these and the expressions of western philosophy, ‘efficient cause,’ ‘final cause,’ ‘material cause,’ ‘formal cause,’ ‘instrumental cause,’ etc. Different ‘seers,’ by difference of personal constitution, and time, place and circumstance, see different aspects naturally. The descriptions that follow will enable the reader, who cares to study the subject more closely, to adjust the ‘personal equations’ and see what correspondences there are.

¹ The more technical grammatical expressions are omitted as impossible to translate.

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Proper, desirable, to do—that is kāryam. Only that is ‘fit to do’ which ‘is to become’ (prearranged, premeditated, ‘provided for’ by providence, ‘the will of God’ etc.). And all ‘becoming’ is ‘to become, to happen’ (in the proper times and places); for all becoming is matter of necessity, and whatever is necessary is done. Thus kāryam, the ‘to be done,’ ‘work,’ ‘duty,’ is included in kriyā, action. Kāryam is also called karma. That which is ‘the most desired to be obtained’² by the actor—that is karma. And the yogya, ‘the fit or proper to unite with,’ the ‘joinable,’ is ‘the most desired.’ Every actor enters upon work after duly considering to the best of his intelligence what is fit or not fit for him to do. Hence kārya is karma. The Brähma-Sūtra says: The most desired is karma.

¹ All this may at first sight appear to be more quibbling—but is not so. The importance attached to philology in ancient thought has been explained in a preceding footnote. Here, in terms of philology, it is explained why some jīvas perform action, which to others appear frivolous or harmful. As to “the most desired” being karma, this seems to be a somewhat colloquial way of saying that a person acts only in accordance with his deepest, most real, most actual desire and conviction. Strictly, the object of desire is substance, not action; all others are objects only indirectly.

²
That which immediately, without the help of a medium, accomplishes a karṇa—that is karṇa. It is this immediacy which distinguishes the karṇa, the cause, from the kartā, the doer. Otherwise, on the view that a piece of work is accomplished only by whosoever desires it most, the one would take the place of the other. As it is, the Science of Language declares: The immediate executor, beneficial to (i.e., promotive of or favoring the existence or the accomplishment of,) the result in the highest degree, is the karṇa, while the kartā is more distant. As the Nāyāyikas say: That which is immediately next before another—is its cause. Or the Mīmāṁsakas: The immediate is the chief cause. Or the Vaiśeṣikas: That which accomplishes or brings about in the highest degree, and is immediate—that is the cause. Or the Sāṅkhya: The immediate one of the three is the cause. Or the Vaiśeṣikas: The origination or production of things without a medium, immediately—this is cause (or causing). Or the Yogis: The abhiniyona, or disposition, assignment, allocation, arrangement, of all immediately (—this is causing). Because such is the only distinction between the two, therefore is only one case, the śrutiya, third or instrumental employed for both (doer and cause, to indicate their relation to the effect)—‘caused by’ as well as ‘done by’.

The karṭā is that which or he who appears, shines forth, manifests in kriyā as self-dependent. He who acts is inside the action, permeates and pervades it. He is said to be self-dependent, because without him kriyā cannot take place (while he himself is not bound to perform any particular kriyā). He initiates action and makes it possible. Tantrā is adhikāra, office, function, authority, business, business-relation, reference; and one who functions only as authorised by himself, and is not put into relations with any one or anything by the will of any other—such a one is svādhisthana or svatāntara. Thus, then, the karaṇa, the self-directed causer of action, nirekṣitya or independent, ‘not looking to another,’ is the name of the kartā. Of course it is true that all limited things or persons are mutually dependent; but because the

1 It would seem that the word karṇa in this part of the text is used in the sense in which karaṇa, or instrument, or instrumental cause, is used now-a-days.

2 A Brahma-Sūtra aphorism defining tantrā is quoted here and briefly expounded. The whole looks very promising in a psycho-philological reference, but is so very obscure and incomplete that I have not ventured on a translation.
s v a, (the own), is declared to be the Ā t m ā, the Self, therefore it is also said to be self-dependent. The sole creator, maker, actor, kar t ā of This-world is Ā t m ā, and It is in every way undisputedly Self-dependent. Following It, in imitation of It, all selves, small or large, everywhere, everywhere and always appear as self-dependent (i.e., possessed of free-will) also.

The pr a yo j a n a, ‘engaging motive,’ that which induces a person to engage in or ‘joins him to’ work, y o j a y a t ī, or that which is joined, y u j y a t o, i.e., that by or by means or because of which work is joined or engaged in by the worker, or which itself joins with or merges in the worker or the work or both, to bring the two together—that is the pr a yo j a n a. It is the ‘totality,’ the summation of the three, viz., worker, instrument and work. (From the transcendental or metaphysical standpoint) all is joined with and inseparably related to all; hence all is motive to all. Because of the union of I and This, I is the maker or creator of all; and because It is in touch with every piece of the Not-I, therefore all particulars may also be said to be in immediate contact with each other; therefore all (and each) is the cause of all (and each). Yet, again, the effect is nothing else than the cause; and the cause nothing else than the effect. And the case is the same with actor and motive (for motive is ultimately desire, and desire is part of the being of the actor). On this principle, all is the k ā r y a or effect of all, too. From the empirical or experiential standpoint of the limited and the particular, on the other hand, each appears as different and separate.

As stated in the Nyāya: V y ā k a r a n a, the gathering together of all things, all p a d ā r t h a s, all objects whatsoever, in one (i.e., seeing the whole of the World-process, inner and outer, within and without, subjective and objective, as one unbroken continuum of consciousness); and then the contemplation of the past, present and future of this continuum as all concentrated into one, (one point, one Now and one Here), all at once and all as one—this is the supreme k r i y ā.

The actor is the Self; the work, the Not-Self; the instrumental cause, the Negation or Desire; the motive is the Summation.

1 See the Science of Peace, ch. xi. for discussion on free-will, and explanation of how the Whole is the cause of each part.