

CHAPTER XXII.

FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS AS TO KRIYĀ.

The supreme importance of *kriyā*.—Philological considerations and illustrations.—Opposite doctrines; (a) all words are derivative and of gradual growth and evolution; (b) all are radical and fortuitous.—Reconciliation by difference of standpoint.—Triplets involved by *kriyā*.—Space-time-motion as objective conditions of it.—Definitions of space, of time, and of energy (in place of motion).—Their relations, as *locus standi*, one to another.—The subjective conditions of *kriyā*.—*Kartā* or actor.—*Kārya*, act or work.—*Kāraṇa* (or *kaṛaṇa*?), cause or instrumental cause, instrument.—*Prayojana*, 'engaging' motive.—Explanation of free-will or self-dependence.—Metaphysical considerations of the interdependence of all.—Correspondences.

The supreme importance of *kriyā*, work, action, is manifest from the fact that the whole of the World-process is one constant activity. Even the correct use of language is not possible without action (*i.e.*, without the action of speaking, obviously; and also, without the employment of words denoting activity). It may be said that sense may be conveyed also by the exclusive use of *subaṇṭas*, nouns variously

FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS AS TO KRIYĀ. 281

inflected with prepositional terminations. But in reality such nouns always imply and depend upon *ṭiṅgaṇṭas*, verbs variously inflected.¹ (For when it is said that *subaṇṭas* suffice by themselves to convey sense, what is really done is that) *kr̥ḍaṇṭas*, various participles (which, for purposes of case-endings behave exactly like the other *subaṇṭas*) are included amongst the *subaṇṭas* and regarded as one with them; and so only, *i.e.*, by using *kr̥ḍaṇṭas* with *subaṇṭas*, can any sense be intellegibly conveyed. And it is obvious that in reality *kr̥ḍaṇṭas* are the same as *ṭiṅgaṇṭas*. In the (apparently verbless Samskr̥ṭ) sentence, 'This, here, by me done; not done by thee,' composed of 'nouns' only,

¹ All these considerations of grammar may at first sight perhaps appear inappropriate to the modern reader accustomed to meet with grammar and psychology in separate text-books only. But he should remember that the *Praṇava-Vāda* purports to be an encyclopædia of the underlying principles of *all* the sciences, showing the interrelation between them; and further that thought and language are particularly interdependent at the present stage of evolution, sound and *ākāśa* being earlier manifestations than the others. Not only in Samskr̥ṭ, but even in other languages also, though perhaps to a lesser extent, philology throws light on psychology in a most valuable manner.

although the word 'done' appears to be a participial adjective to 'work,' yet in reality it amounts to the verb-expression, 'has been done'. If this same analysis is pursued further it will appear that even as *kr̥ḍanṭas*, participial adjectives, behaving as the nouns with which they are in apposition, have their manifest foundation in verb-roots, even so these nouns proper of to-day ultimately derive their origin in the past from roots denoting activity

The *vyuṭpanna-pakṣha*, 'derivation-doctrine' in grammar is expressly this that all nouns are derived and evolved out of verbs, by the successive addition of various affixes and prefixes, etc., to the latter. On the other side is the *a-vyuṭpanna-pakṣha*, 'non-derivation-doctrine'. This doctrine holds that all words, names, namings, are underived, radical, fortuitous, arbitrary, like *Brahman* itself; that they are independent of all considerations of time, space, and affinity with others; that they have no analysable characteristics, and are each and all pre-destined, like all the other items of all Becoming, all the World-process; that no real explanation of them is possible; and that each speaker uses them according as their meanings appear to him under the stress of his necessity so that the same word-sound means one thing in one

language and entirely another in another.

The reconciliation between these views is that in one sense all words are derivative; and in another, all radical. The words that express disruption of the unity of the I, refer to activity, and are all derived from verb-roots denoting action; this is the view from the standpoint of *vyāṣṭi*, the part, the particular, the individual. On the other hand, the words that are concerned with the universal unity of the I, they are non-derivative, radical; this is the standpoint of the *sārṇika*, universal. And, finally, each and every word is both of these, in turn, from different standpoints; each is derivative and each radical.¹

¹ This may perhaps be expressed in other words thus: We may be able to trace the existing words of any language further and further back to roots behind roots; but wherever we come to a stop, there, we must admit, at least for the time being and till we can burrow further, that the connexion between that last-found root and its meaning is fortuitous. Onomatopœia will not help beyond certain limits. That the serpent moving through grass should make the sound 'sarp, sarp' or 'srip, srip' is itself fortuitous, accidental, arbitrary. We may develop our science of acoustics and of the physiology of the auditory apparatus, and, going a step further, understand how that particular shaking of grass appears as that particular sound to this

Hence has it been declared that all words are classifiable into nouns and verbs, the former corresponding to *Ātma* and the latter to *Anātmā*; and again that the 'derivative'

particular human ear; but if any one of these three factors varies, the result changes, and a deeper 'how' and 'why' are again to seek.

From different standpoints—variations of the two main ones, the transcendental and the empirical—because of the universal reign of the law of causality and progressive development of effects out of causes, we have the 'derivation-doctrine,' the theory of evolution in the kingdom of words; because of the ultimate fact that nothing can appear in effect which was not already in the cause, that all evolution is only a successive unfolding of a pre-existent simultaneous 'many' which includes at once all possible forms whatsoever, we have the 'radicality-doctrine,' eternally fixed species. All words and all things else are 'derived' from the Absolute Consciousness, within which they all eternally exist as 'arbitrary,' 'unique presentations,' each 'separate and different' from all others. (See *The Science of Peace*, p. 123.)

The particular psychological and metaphysical significance of the discussion and conclusion that nouns are derived from verbs, while verbs themselves may be regarded as radical, is that manifestation, manifested *existence*, is not possible without activity (See *The Science of Peace*, p. 240; also the pages on 'Grammar,' *supra*.)

words refer to *kriyā*, and the radical are *sanātana*, eternal.

The *sṭhāna*, *locus standi*, of activity is *ḍesha*, space. All action takes place in space and is impossible without it. The triplet here is *ḍesha-kāla-kriyā*, space-time-motion. That wherein and whereby is possible the many-ness of the This, the opposition to the unity of the I—that is Space. In other words, it is the *avasṭhā*, the *condition* of the negation or identity between I and This. It is true that when a *vasṭhā* is spoken of, there is already an implication of some kind of action (*sṭhā*, to stand); yet the predominant reference is to the 'standing,' the continuance in one place of that action; and so a *vasṭhā* comes invariably to imply space. The etymology runs thus: *ava*¹ is the *Ātma* which ought to be carefully 'guarded' on all sides and is in turn the 'protector' of all; and that wherein it 'stands' and manifests is *sṭhā*. Thus the general condition of the possibility of the 'standing' of all particular conditions and states is Space. As the *Brahma-Sūtra* says: The state of opposition to the Unity of the Self is the many, *nānā*; and the opposition to the identification of the many is Space (*i.e.*, the

¹ In modern Samskr̥t Grammar, *ava*, as a prefix, means 'on all sides, all round'; and *av*, as a verb-root, means to protect.

necessary condition in which becomes possible that opposition; or that space is itself of the nature of opposition between the one and the many, which, by mutual abolition, make emptiness).

Again, the *Brahma-Sūtra* says: The succession in and of the many is time, Kāla.

Yet again: The necessity of the succession is *Shakṭi*, Ability, Might, Energy.

These three aphorisms¹ define the essential nature of the triplet. The necessary 'becoming,' coming forth, manifesting (co-existently) of the many is *deśha*, space. Whatever 'becomes' has phases or conditions; and we also want to enquire 'where does it become, i.e., manifest'. 'What happens; what or who causes it to, i.e., why does it, happen; how does it happen, by what process or method'—all these are allied considerations. The very etymology and definition of the word *deśha* shows the real nature of the fact indicated, that wherein a thing is

¹ Compare these with the fourteen aphorisms mentioned in the Preface, p. li. as framed by the translator, tentatively for his own use, long before he had heard of the *Praṇava-Vāda*—showing how all truths ever exist in the store of All-Knowledge, and how individuals see little pieces of them from time to time, even without continuous handing on from generation to generation in the flesh.

'shown forth,' *ḍishyaṭe*, 'created,' *sṛjyaṭe*, 'stands,' *sṭhīyaṭe*. Yet again, the appearance in *yoga*, combination, juxtaposition, of I and This is space. 'Here, there'—this is the form of space. It should be remembered that space can never be defined or indicated except in terms of *kriyā*.

On the other hand *kriyā*, motion, is connected equally with time. Space and time are not immediately but only indirectly connected with each other, through the medium of motion which is immediately related to both. The *locus standi* of time is motion; that of motion, space. Space, because it is the forum of both time and motion is sometimes described as the Self Itself.¹

All action inevitably involves four inseparable factors, *karṭā*, *kārya*, *kāraṇa* and *prayōjana*, i.e., actor, act, cause and motive.²

¹ Compare the *Paurāṇika* legend that Kāla-Rudra, (a form of *Shiva*, corresponding to desire, *ṭamas* or *ichchhā* and time, *kāla*, which also means 'black') was born from *Brahmā* (corresponding to *kriyā*) and that *Brahmā* was born from *Viṣṇu* (corresponding to *jñāna* and Self.) Also the *Purāṇa* verse विष्णुरात्मवतां श्रेष्ठो दुर्विषयतमो भवः, "Viṣṇu is the best of the Possessors of Self; Bhava or Rudra is the most irresistible."

² It is not easy to fix the correspondence exactly

These four correspond, as usual, to A, U, M and the total, or cognition, desire, action and the summation. Indeed the totality of these four is *kriyā*. The definition or description of *kriyā* is possible only by means of these four. The etymology of *kriyā* is manifold; so also is its significance.¹ (i) *karaṇam*, doing, acting, is *kriyā*, the act or action itself. Or (ii) *kriyate anena* or *anayā*, that by or by means of which (a thing or act) is done, acted, made, is *kriyā*. This construction is connected with the idea of causal effort. Again (iii) *karoti iti kriyā*, 'does,' 'acts'—this itself is *kriyā*. Here the reference is to the actor the doer, the maker, *karṭā*. The manifestation of the *kriyā* (self-assertion or self-realisation by external expression), the final purpose of the other three, is the motive, *prayōjana*.

Karṭum योग्यम्, that which is fit, between these and the expressions of western philosophy, 'efficient cause,' 'final cause,' 'material cause,' 'formal cause,' 'instrumental cause,' etc. Different 'seers,' by difference of personal constitution, and time, place and circumstance, see different aspects naturally. The descriptions that follow will enable the reader, who cares to study the subject more closely, to 'adjust the 'personal equations' and see what correspondences there are.

¹ The more technical grammatical expressions are omitted as impossible to translate.

proper, desirable, to do—that is *kāryam*. Only that is 'fit to do' which 'is to become' (prearranged, premeditated, 'provided for' by providence, 'the will of God' etc.). And *all* 'becoming' is 'to become, to happen' (in the proper times and places); for all becoming is matter of necessity, and whatever is necessary is done. Thus *kāryam*, the 'to be done,' 'work,' 'duty,' is included in *kriyā*, action. *Kāryam* is also called *karmā*. That which is "the most desired to be obtained" by the actor—that is *karmā*. And the *yogyā*, 'the fit or proper to unite with,' the 'joinable,' is 'the most desired'. Every actor enters upon work after duly considering to the best of his intelligence what is fit or not fit for him to do. Hence *kārya* is *karmā*. The *Brahma-Sūtra* says: The most desired is *karmā*.¹

¹ All this may at first sight appear to be mere quibbling—but is not so. The importance attached to philology in ancient thought has been explained in a preceding footnote. Here, in terms of philology, it is explained why some *jīvas* perform action, which to others appear frivolous or harmful. As to "the most desired" being *karmā*,—this seems to be a somewhat colloquial way of saying that a person acts only in accordance with his deepest, most real, most actual desire and conviction. Strictly, the object of desire is substance, not action; all others are objects only indirectly.

That which immediately, without the help of a medium, accomplishes a *kārya*—that is *kāraṇam*. It is this immediacy which distinguishes the *kāraṇam*, the cause, from the *karṭā*, the doer. Otherwise, on the view that a piece of work is accomplished only by whosoever desires it most, the one would take the place of the other. As it is, the Science of Language declares: The immediate executor, beneficial to (*i.e.*, promotive of or favoring the existence or the accomplishment of,) the result in the highest degree, is the *kāraṇa*, while the *karṭā* is more distant. As the Nayyayikas say: That which is immediately next before another—is its cause. Or the Mīmāṃsakas: The im-mediate is the chief cause. Or the Vedāntis: That which accomplishes or brings about in the highest degree, and is immediate—that is the cause. Or the Sāṅkhyas: The immediate one of the three is the cause. Or the Vaiśeṣhikas: The origination or production of things without a medium, immediately—this is cause (or causing). Or the Yogis: The *abhi-ni-yo-jana*, or disposition, assignment, allocation, arrangement, of all immediately (—this is causing). Because such is the only distinction between the two, therefore is only one case, the *trītiyā*, third or instrumental employed for both (doer

and cause, to indicate their relation to the effect)—‘caused by’ as well as ‘done by’.¹

The *karṭā* is that which or he who appears, shines forth, manifests in *kriyā* as self-dependent. He who acts is inside the action, permeates and pervades it. He is said to be self-dependent, because without him *kriyā* cannot take place (while he himself is not bound to perform any particular *kriyā*). He initiates action and makes it possible. *Tantra* is a *ḍhikāra*, office, function, authority, business, business-relation, reference; and one who functions only as authorised by himself, and is not put into relations with any one or anything by the will of any other—such a one is *svā-ḍhikārī* or *sva-tantra*.² Thus, then, the *kāraka*, the self-directed causer of action, *nirapekṣhiṭa* or independent, ‘not looking to another,’ is the name of the *karṭā*. Of course it is true that all limited things or persons are mutually dependent; but because the

¹ It would seem that the word *kāraṇa* in this part of the text is used in the sense in which *karāṇa*, or instrument, or instrumental cause, is used now-a-days.

² A *Brahma-Sūtra* aphorism defining *tantra* is quoted here and briefly expounded. The whole looks very promising in a psycho-philological reference, but is so very obscure and incomplete that I have not ventured on a translation.

s va, (the own), is declared to be the Āt mā, the Self, therefore is it also said to be self-dependent. The sole creator, maker, actor, kartā of This-world is Āt mā, and It is in every way undisputedly Self-dependent. Following It, in imitation of It, all selves, small or large, everywhen, everywhere and always appear as self-dependent (*i.e.*, possessed of free-will) also.¹

The prayojana, 'engaging motive,' that which induces a person to engage in or 'joins him to' work, yojayati, or that which is joined, yujyate, *i.e.*, that by or by means or because of which work is joined or engaged in by the worker, or which itself joins with or merges in the worker or the work or both, to bring the two together—that is the prayojana. It is the 'totality,' the summation of the three, *viz.*, worker, instrument and work. (From the transcendental or metaphysical standpoint) all is joined with and inseparably related to all; hence all is motive to all. Because of the union of I and This, I is the maker or creator of all; and because It is in touch with every piece of the Not-I, therefore all particulars may also be said to be in immediate contact with each

¹ See *the Science of Peace*, ch. xi. for discussion on free-will, and explanation of how the *Whole* is the cause of each part.

other; therefore all (and each) is the cause of all (and each). Yet, again, the effect is nothing else than the cause; and the cause nothing else than the effect. And the case is the same with actor and motive (for motive is ultimately desire, and desire is part of the being of the actor). On this principle, all is the kār ya or effect of all, too. From the empirical or experiential standpoint of the limited and the particular, on the other hand, each appears as different and separate.

As stated in the *Nyāya*: Vyāharaṇa, the gathering together of all things, all paḍārthas, all objects whatsoever, in one (*i.e.*, seeing the whole of the World-process, inner and outer, within and without, subjective and objective, as one unbroken continuum of consciousness); and then the contemplation of the past, present and future of this continuum as all concentrated into one, (one point, one Now and one Here), all at once and all as one—this is the supreme kriyā.¹

The actor is the Self; the work, the Not-Self; the instrumental cause, the Negation or Desire; the motive is the Summation.

¹ Compare *Yoga-Sūtra*, iii. 51, on vivekajajñāna, which seems to answer to nothing more closely than the Logion, summing up all at once and also amounting to viveka-khyāti.