CHAPTER XXIV.

THE PRINCIPAL FORMS OF KRIYA.

The four sub-divisions of kriyā.—Similar sub-divisions of cognition and desire.—(i.) Kriyā, its nature and significance.—(ii.) Praţikriyā.—(iii.) Vikriyā.—(iv.) Upakriyā.—The synthesis of the four in an endless chain of cause and effect.—The mutual relation of motionlessness and incessant movements, as that of substance and attribute.—Manifestations of kriyā as human karma and arts.

The sub-divisions of karma have been dealt with in the preceding chapter. In kriyā also we may distinguish four sub-divisions: (i.) kriyā, action; (ii.) praţikriyā, reaction; (iii.) vikriyā, change, transformation; (iv.) upakriyā, 'all-helping,' 'acting near or around or for all,' beneficence, philanthropy. These correspond to A, U, M and the Total respectively. The kriyānṭara, 'another action' that immediately follows after an action or kriyā, is the praţikriyā, the reaction. In praţikriyā, the manifestation is similar to, on the same lines as, that of kriyā (but, inversed or reversed, as a reflexion). The first form is kriyā; residing within it as its opposite is

pratikriyā. The 'destruction' of both action and reaction is vikriyā. Vigaţākrivā, 'action gone,' the disappearance of action, is vikriyā; and when action goes, reaction goes too; (and what is left behind, the resultant of the two, is vikriyā). It is true that kriyā is declared to be incessant; but because of the conventions and laws of periodicity, we have the appearance of beginnings and ends therein; and hence the truth of the statement regarding its disappearance. That which appears, bhāsate, must suffer disappearance, vi-bhāsana, also. And action and reaction follow the same rule, even as Self and Not-Self do. Upa-kriyā is that which is 'near' all and brings all 'near' each other. Upa means samipe, 'near,' and karanam is 'making,' 'doing,' 'acting'; and nearness, proximity, relationship subsists between all, always, everywhere and ever.

Of these four, all of which are always taking place in every atom, two, viz., action and reaction, may be regarded as the most important; 'transformation' only lies between them.

But why do we not have similar sub-divisions under jñāna, cognition, etc.? Why do we not have praţi-jñāna and the rest? Truly we do have them; only convention finds it more convenient to express them by the use of such adjectives as saţ and asaţ, true and false etc.¹ In combination with kriyā only is the prefix praţi used specially, because kriyā is a matter of outward (visible) contact and manifests in overt movement (and the connotation of praţi is that of 'facing towards,' 'confronting,' opposing overtly, also).

But might it not be said that cognition, etc., have also a similar origin (in the 'facing' each other of the Self and the Not-Self)? True; still we might also say that by a special and predominant connexion with the inner Self, they have a kind of (comparative)

¹In current Samskṛt, the more frequent word is upakāra, an act of service, a benefit, a kindness, done by one to another. The philosophy of the usage, the reason why, is given by the succeeding sentences of the text.

In current Samskṛṭ, praṭijñā (the more common form as against praṭijñāna) means 'promise'; vijñāna, special knowledge, knowledge of concrete details; and upajñāna, invention. Error, as opposite to truth, is spoken of as a-jñāna, which is also used for non-knowledge or ignorance. For 'practical' purposes, negative ignorance in action is and becomes positive error. So, perhaps, under ichchhā we may distinguish like, dislike, tolerance (or indifference in a certain sense) and general benevolence.

independence (of the outer world). While undoubtedly kriyā arises out of the entrance into partnership, the co-operation, the joint business, of the Self and the Not-Self, still, this statement does not lessen the high status of the Self. For the Self is all-inclusively distinct from all and is eternal, while the Not-Self is dependent on another, on the Self. Even while inseparably united and indeed one, yet are the two as end and means, organism and organ.¹

These four, kriyā, etc., may be described in terms of the Logion as below:

'I am this thus'—is kriyā. For, see. There is I within I, and 'this' within 'this,' and 'not' within 'not'. And the significance of an I within an I is that the unity of the I is contradicted. 'I am one' is not a fact; but, rather, there is another I within that I and that is the 'this'. So again, there is a further 'this' within the 'this,' and this second 'this' is the 'thus,' itth am. When the question is asked 'How is there an I within an I,' then the answer is 'thus'. And this is kriyā.'

Not-Self is dependent on the Self. If the Self is dependent at all on the Not-Self, It is so dependent only for Its Self-manifestation, as an end on a means; whereas the Not-Self, is dependent on the Self for very existence, fleeting and ever-negated, a mere passing (though endlessly passing) breath of existence as it is. And so

'All this portion of the text is difficult to follow, with its subtle playing with and ringing of changes on the words of the Logion. I have tried to make the translation as literal as possible, to give the reader the chance of 'construing' for himself. The description of kriyā may be paraphrased thus. The essential idea of all action, of all 'movement,' is self-realisation, self-manifestation, by means of successive identification of the self with various

¹In other words, though all the three phases or aspects of consciousness arise in the interplay of subject and object, and from the transcendental standpoint are on the same level, equally overt or equally covert; yet from the empirical standpoint, cognition is more inner than outer, and action is more outer than inner, while desire stands midway and holds together both. As said again and again in the text, cognition corresponds with the Self, action with the Not-Self, desire with Negation. So, although from the transcendental standpoint, the Trinity are all equal and none is greater than the other and we can make no distinctions, yet, from the empirical standpoint, we cannot help feeling that the Self is more we ourselves than the Not-Self is. For us, the Self is more important. By our verbal expansion and description of the Logion, the Self posits and negates the Not-Self, not vice versa. The Self is the Master, the Self-dependent. The

'I am thus and this is thus' is prați kriyā. As the question is asked, 'How is (or am) I' and again, 'How is there an I again within that I,' the answer comes up, 'I am thus, because I am the Self, universal, omnipresent, i.e., I am in all and all is in I, and there is no difference between all and I.' In this way, to say that 'I am thus' is to indicate the condition of another I included within an I; and again to say that 'this is thus' is to indicate the condition of still another I within the second I; and another within that; and so on endlessly. For the World-process is made up of the interplay of I's beyond count. And this lack of finality itself, this anavasthā, this infinite regressus is pratikrivā.

Vikriyā is 'I-this-thus-not' i.e., I am not this thus. Whatever condition one arrives into, becomes 'unbearable,' 'bearable with difficulty,' prasahya, (in the sense almost of a-sahya), forced, unpleasant, before long. The jīva does not find 'complete satisfaction' (which belongs only to the Praṭyagāṭmā-state, while the jīva in its small sheath is the reverse of complete) in that state, but forthwith begins to long

by the Whole, the Universal aspect of the I, to each change of each part or small I, constitutes reaction, and is the cause of the nullification of the previous kriyā of identification of a self with a particular sheath. In other words, it is the backward swing constituted by the second half of the Logion, opposing the forward swing made by its first half. So viewed, pratikrivā appears the natural supplement of kriyā as described in the preceding footnote, as fittingly as in the wording of the text. It should be noted that because this backward swing op-poses the forward, positively, therefore it becomes an 'inversion,' a 'reflexion' of it and puts on an 'appearance' like that of the forward one and does not become a mere, pure negative and universal abolition. Hence the annulment and repudiation of one identification becomes, not no-identification, but identification with another, an opposite, and so on.

Hence too the reference to the 'condition' of another I within an I, etc. On this point, to the two aspects noted in the preceding footnote may be added the

^{&#}x27;this's,' bodies, sheaths: I am a mineral, I am a vegetable, I am an animal, I am a man, I am a god and so on. At each successive step, the ego discovers greater depths and potentialities within itself, and unfolds them. Another aspect of this same general idea is the ego's transference of its centre of consciousness to sheath within sheath, subtler and subtler, from physical to astral, thence to mental, etc., on the nivṛṭṭi path, as it performed the reverse process on the pravṛṭṭi path, transferring the centre of consciousness to sheath without sheath.

One way of describing the intention of the text here would probably be that the resistance offered

for another. By this greed and discontent, the existing condition is naturally destroyed. I ttham, 'thus,' means nothing else than an avasthā, condition, fixed state, 'standing'. 'I am thus' means 'such is my condition'. Consequently 'I am not thus,' 'this is not thus,' is the form of vikriyā (which primarily means

following consideration: When we endeavor to describe the 'condition' of a thing, we imply tacitly that the 'thing' is something permanent and single and has or owns and possesses many modes which are its conditions. Now each of these modes may be regarded as, and indeed is, the thing itself, and yet is distinguishable from it. 'How am I?,' 'I am well,' 'I am ill,' 'I am glad,' 'I am sad,' etc. Here, all five I's are one and the same, and yet it may be said that the last four I's are different from each other and from the first, and are included in that first. The primal archetype of the distinction between substance or substratum and attribute is the distinction (without separability) between Self and Not-Self. 'Thing' and 'qualities'-is the reflexion of that in the limited. All the evolutionary and involutionary experiences that the jiva passes through, all the endless bodies it puts on and discards, are its 'attributes,' qualities, with itself as 'substance' or substratum, are the all-possible pseudo-infinite possibilities stored within each one, each atom, each 'biophorid,' which it successively unfolds from within itself and enfolds back again.

change, transformation, and secondarily 'evil change,' degeneration, corruption, also).

Upa-kriyā is 'I-am-(all) This, Not-thus-Nor-that (other) way, nor like (this), nor otherwise' (but in all ways; I am, somehow, anyhow, and it does not matter at all in what particular way). This is why even the 'knowers' say: 'Whatever condition you are in, stay there; what is the use of this, or that, or another?; the scheme of affairs is sure to be carried out in accordance with destiny, the to-be; what is the use of striving otherwise'? Of course, the obvious reply to this is that the striving, the effort to change the condition, is also in accordance with and induced by the 'to-be,' and the 'knower's' statement is therefore meaningless. But it is justified (or at least the fact that such statements are made is explained) by paribhrama-vyavahāra, the 'behavior' or conventions of illusion.2 Even the knowers

¹One way of interpreting this sentence, in consonance with the modern use of the word upakāra, 'doing a good deed to help another,' would be this: 'I am always full of satisfaction, for even in my loss I have the consolation that my loss is necessarily another's gain; if I have lost in this body, the same I have gained in that other body, all I's being the same I.'

² The statement here is rather puzzling. It may 21

suffer illusion, bhrama, 'wandering,' 'going astray,' 'going round and round,' in this transcendental endlessness of the World-process. Indeed, everyone is sarva-jña, omniscient, and at the same time ignorant and 'little-knowing,' alpa-jña. Whatever condition one has attained to, he is omniscient as regards all conditions preceding, and ignorant as regards those succeeding it. Only this (comparative) omniscience (the full recovery of the knowledge, the memory, of the past) is the net result of yoga. Hence yogis too are said to be only 'little-knowing'

be interpreted thus: After knowledge of the final truth has been attained, the proper attitude in 'practical' matters is that we should exercise our best judgment, and base exertion, and take action, by all means, on the data available to us, in each particular situation—such judgment and exertion being also included in the all-destiny; and that we should do so without fret or worry over consequences, without feverish cravings, anxieties and regrets. But, in the confusion of the moment, when trying to warn or console another against such frets and regrets, even the 'knower' often states the right conclusion with wrong premises! He confuses the consolatory with the directive or mandatory, and the past with the future—by an illusive imitation within the limited of what is absolutely true in and only in and of the whole.

—for knowledge by a limited, embodied individual, of the unlimited Whole (in its endless details) is impossible.

The synthesis, the co-ordination, of this endless activity in all its forms is possible and actually takes place in the way of cause and effect; this arises from or out of this, and this other from another—and so on. And the 'practical' teaching to be inferred from all the above, its 'pragmatic' bearing, is that we should abandon the three others and take refuge in up akriyā, action near and for all, that impartially benefits all and leads each to a happiness that is shared in common with all and is not separate for each.

As said before, the essential significance of kriyā is, of course, the omnipresence of the Self, and the necessity of 'becoming' everywhere, concomitantly with that omnipresence; for existence, a stitva, is-ness, is manifestation, working, activity; existence being impossible without action. Yet, distinguishing between the two, we may say that in the aspect of mere a stitva, the World-process is a motionlessness; and that the sva-bhāva, the nature or character of that a stitva and motionlessness is incessant activity. One law of all activity is that everything goes back to the condition in or from which it began. Thus,

324

a mahā-manvanṭara oegins (in the ending) and ends in the beginning of another mahā-manvanṭara. Or, again, a child is born, i.e., begins to exist out of non-existence, and after living its life as a human, again goes back into the non-existence out of which it came. Or, from another standpoint, everything comes out, lives in and goes back into existence, bhāva, being. Or, yet again, nothing ever comes forth, or stays, or departs. Thus does action arise out of actionlessness and go back into it. This change of form, rūpānṭara, is vikriyā.

The (inner) nature of kriyā in its aspect of human (ethical) karma is duly expounded in the Mīmāmsā. Its (outer) forms, changes and transformations, should be studied in the Shilpa-Shāstra, applied sciences and arts. And because the essence and even the details of it are present in every atom, therefore is it declared that there is punya, merit, in the observation of even a single atom (being the indispensable preparation for all-knowledge). As the Scriptures declare: Behold Brahman in every atom, know the atom, know the super-atom; therein is knowledge, therein science.

It may be noted that each kind of activity defines, outlines, gives name and form to, the

world in its own terms. Hence we have the expressions—the world of knowledge, the world of action, the world of desire, the world of science, the world of language, etc. Yet all in truth are always threaded on the Pratyagāṭmā.